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Abstract
Counterparty risk denotes the risk that a party defaults in a bilateral contract. This
risk not only depends on the two parties involved, but also on the risk from various other
contracts each of these parties holds. In rather informal markets, such as the OTC (over-the-
counter) derivative market, institutions only report their aggregated quarterly risk exposure,
but no details about their counterparties. Hence, little is known about the diversification of
counterparty risk. In this paper, we reconstruct the weighted and time-dependent network
of counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives market of the United States between 1998 and
2012. To proxy unknown bilateral exposures, we first study the co-occurrence patterns of
institutions based on their quarterly activity and ranking in the official report. The network
obtained this way is further analysed by a weighted k-core decomposition, to reveal a core-
periphery structure. This allows us to compare the activity-based ranking with a topology-
based ranking, to identify the most important institutions and their mutual dependencies.
We also analyse correlations in these activities, to show strong similarities in the behavior of
the core institutions. Our analysis clearly demonstrates the clustering of counterparty risk in
a small set of about a dozen US banks. This not only increases the default risk of the central
institutions, but also the default risk of peripheral institutions which have contracts with the
central ones. Hence, all institutions indirectly have to bear (part of) the counterparty risk of
all others, which needs to be better reflected in the price of OTC derivatives.
Introduction
After the financial crisis of 2008 the systemic risk resulting from OTC (over-the-counter)
derivatives has become an important topic of public debate and scientific research. Differ-
ent from exchange-traded derivatives, OTC derivatives are traded on non-regulated markets
which have grown both in size and importance during the last decade. In December 2008 the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported (see Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics
at http://www.bis.org) that total notional amount on outstanding OTC derivatives grew up
from 370,178 bn USD in June 2006 to 683,725 bn USD in June 2008, i.e., it almost doubled in
size in only two years.
1Corresponding author: fschweitzer@ethz.ch
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A particular worrying feature of this development results from the increasing concentration of
the counterparty risk of OTC derivatives in the hands of only a few institutions. This trend has
not changed after the financial crisis of 2008, on the contrary the concentration increased.
Taking the example of the US alone, in the 4th quarter of 1998 contracts totaling 331 bn USD
were signed by 422 commercial banks and trust companies which where not listed in the top
25 institutions dealing with OTC derivatives. This numbers have to be compared against the
contracts totaling 32,668 bn USD (i.e., a hundred times more) signed by only the top 25 insti-
tutions in the OTC derivatives market. Comparing this to the time after the financial crisis, the
difference became much bigger. In the 1st quarter of 2012 the 25 top ranked US institutions held
contracts totaling 227,486 bn USD (i.e., almost ten times more than in 1998), whereas all other
institutions held contracts totaling only 496 bn USD (which is almost comparable to what was
held in 1998). Hence, we observe an extreme concentration of derivatives market where the share
of derivative contracts held by the top 25 institutions was almost 99% in 1998 and increased to
more than 99.5% in 2012.
This increasing concentration may also increase the vulnerability of the institutions involved
and can lead to cascades in case of default. Until now, no concentration of exposure against
a particular counterparty is reported by banks. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
referred to this issue for the first time only in its report of March 2013 [1].
In our paper, we address the problem in a twofold way. Based on a dataset of the 25 most active
players in the U.S. derivative market, over a period of 14 years, we reconstruct the network of
counterparty risk. We show that this risk generates an almost fully connected network of inter-
dependence among these players, however it is skewly distributed, i.e., most of the counterparty
risk is concentrated in only 10 mayor institutions. This implies two problems: in a fully connected
network, it becomes much more difficult to hedge the risk of default, because every player is a
counterparty of any other. This may increase the risk of default cascades, which can be amplified
by the particularly active counterparties. Additionally, the concentration of counterparty risk in
a few institutions may exacerbate the problem of contagion and financial distress in the whole
network if those institutions become distressed.
OTC Derivatives
The role of derivatives
Derivatives are financial instruments, i.e., they are tradable assets. Importantly, they have no
intrinsic value. Instead, their value depends on, or is derived at least partly from, the value
of other entities, denoted as the “underlying”. These can be other assets such as commodities,
stocks, bonds, interest rates and currencies, but, dependent on the complexity of the financial
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product, the underlying can be almost anything that deemed to have an intrinsic value. This
implies that socio-psychological issues such as “confidence”, “faith” or “trust” play an important
role in defining those values.
Formally, derivatives are specified as contracts between two parties. Such contracts define how
the value of the underlying is estimated at particular future dates and what conditions have to be
fulfilled for payments between these parties. Because parties do not need to own the underlying,
derivatives make for an ideal instrument to speculate about the future rising or falling value
of underlyings or to hedge against the risk associated with it, provided that a counterparty is
willing to bet on this.
Trading derivatives basically means to find a counterparty for the contract. Importantly, parties
can trade derivatives in two different ways, in regulated markets specialized in trading deriva-
tives (ETD, exchange-traded derivatives) or privately, without involving an exchange or other
institutions (OTC, over-the-counter derivatives). Although OTC markets are usually well orga-
nized, they are less formal. In particular, there is no central authority which would regulate the
conditions of the derivative contracts or would control the fulfillment of these conditions.
OTC derivatives are usually preferred over the exchange traded ones because taxes and other
expenses are lower and they are much more flexible, meaning that the counterparties can agree
on very specific or unusual conditions as opposed to the limited set of derivative types designed
and operated by an exchange. As a trade-off for flexibility and the possibility of higher earnings
OTC derivatives bear significant additional risks as compared to the exchange traded ones.
Risk involved in OTC derivatives
Derivatives are generally used to hedge risks, but derivatives themselves are a source of risk.
These are credit risk and market risk, along with liquidity, operational and legal risks [2]. In
case of OTC derivatives, credit risk is the main source of risk because of the usual absence of
a clearing house that guarantees the fulfillment of obligations between parties. Thus, the two
contracting parties are exposed to counterparty default risk, i.e., the risk that a counterparty will
undergo distress, or even default prior to expiration of the contract and thus will not make the
current and future payments. In contrast to lending risk, to which only the party which lends is
exposed, both sides involved in OTC contract are exposed to counterparty risk. To have some
sort of mitigation, the parties involved in OTC derivatives are usually banks which act on their
own behalf or on behalf of their clients.
There are different ways to mitigate counterparty risk in case of default. For example, using
close-out netting agreements allows that all contracts are netted, eliminating the possibility of
selective execution of contracts [3]. For bilateral close-out netting, which mostly applies to OTC
derivatives markets, the two parties agree to net with one another, i.e., to set off gains and losses
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from all of their bilateral contracts. This differs from the case of multilateral close-out netting
which mostly applies to ETD, i.e., to markets where all parties’ obligations are netted together.
In both cases, netting is only a procedure to follow after a default and thus does not address the
emergence of counterparty risk.
It is obvious that netting decreases credit exposure, as it takes into account only the net obli-
gations, thus reducing both operational and settlement risk and operational costs. In order to
know the risk, the present value of contracts, prior to their contracted termination, has to be
determined. Outstanding contracts are marked to market, taking into account the replacement
costs, i.e., the loss suffered by the non-defaulting party in replacing the relevant contract. This as-
sessment of credit exposure at a single point in time is denoted as current credit exposure (CCE).
However, derivative contracts usually have considerable lifetimes and are very often character-
ized by fast and large changes in credit exposure. Therefore, the potential future exposure (PFE)
is used to estimate the possible CCE increase over a fixed time frame. These estimates are, of
course, predictions that depend on the choice of financial models and corresponding confidence
level. The total credit exposure (TCE) is then measured as the sum of CCE and PFE, following
the Basel I framework. In Section Correlations in risk we will use the TCE values reported by
financial institutions to estimate correlations in their risk.
Whereas netting agreements work in the absence of clearing houses, recent developments try to
mitigate counterparty risk by means of central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs) [4]. In the
presence of a CCP a bilateral contract between two counterparties is substituted by two contracts,
so that the CCP stands between the two contracting parties. This allows for more transparency
and for multilateral netting, which can facilitate the reduction of both counterparty and systemic
risk. Although involvement of a CCP was previously required in contracts for credit default swaps
(CDS) [5], a special class of derivatives, its broader utilization can be seen as a reaction to the
financial crisis of 2008.
However, regulations requiring CCPs in all standardized types of OTC derivatives are either new,
e.g. the US Dodd-Frank Act from 2010, or are still being developed. Therefore, their impact on
OTC derivatives markets is not well known yet, both empirically and theoretically. [6] recently
attempted to shed some light on the possible systemic effects from CCPs. They performed a
theoretical investigation of cascading effects and systemic risk in different financial networks
with one or two CCPs.
One may argue that not considering the role of CCPs in OTC derivatives networks is a limitation
of this paper. But one should bear in mind that we analyse data ranging from 1998 to 2012,
i.e., most of the time CCP were not required, and not reflected, in the OTC data. To keep our
methods consistent for the whole time period, we neglect the possible (but not documented)
presence of CCPs. Moreover, even today it is not known whether the wide adoption of CCPs will
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succeed in making the OTC derivatives network entirely transparent. So our methods to infer
undiscovered and potentially dangerous links of the network may still be needed in the future.
Clustering of counterparty risk
In this paper, we discuss a particular risk involved in OTC derivatives, namely the clustering of
counterparty risk. While counterparty risk itself is already difficult to estimate, it becomes even
more tedious for a party to find out about the additional risk that a counterparty bears because
of it’s involvement in other OTC derivatives. The problem is illustrated in Fig. 1. It shows nine
institutions that have in total ten different OTC contracts. The width of the links shall indicate
the volume of these contracts, i.e., the three institutions 1, 2, 3 in the center (indicated by the
dashed line) form a fully connected cluster of strongly engaged institutions. What is their implicit
impact on those institutions outside the center? Each of these has only one contract with one of
the major institutions in the center and is likely not aware of the whole structure of the network
of OTC derivatives.
5
4
8
6 7
3
1
9
2
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the exposure clustering.
There is a two-step scenario to increase the risk of the different institutions: (i) Transfer of risk
from the outer institutions to the central counterparty: Institution 4 is probably not aware that
its counterparty 1 also has contracts with institutions 5 and 6. If one of these outer institutions
defaults, this puts an additional risk for institution 1 to default, which is likely not accounted
for in the OTC contract between 4 and 1. Additionally, institutions 4 and 5 also have a contract
which is likely not known to institution 1. Thus, the default of either 4 or 5 increases the risk
for the remaining one, which indirectly increases the risk for institution 1 [7]. (ii) Increase of
risk between central institutions: Because the center institutions form a fully connected cluster,
if one of these undergoes distress or even defaults this immediately affects the other two core
institutions. This in turn affects the outer institutions.
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In conclusion, because of the strong coupling of the center institutions, which we call clustering
of counterparty risk here, all institutions indirectly have to bear (part of) the counterparty risk
of all other institutions in the network. This should be priced in their OTC derivatives, but
effectively it is not because that would imply to know (a) all the links and (b) all their weights
or, in plain words, all the OTC contracts made. But, as explained above, the existence of OTC
derivatives is precisely because such information should not be made publicly available. As we
will see from the data, all public information only refers to the total amount of OTC derivatives
for each institution, but not to their counterparty network.
This sets the stage for our paper. Even in the absence of official information about the network
of counterparty risk, we want to derive some insights into its structure, from a dataset described
in the following. Specifically, we want to derive a proxy for the structure of this weighted, and
time dependent, network. Further, we want to estimate correlations between OTC derivatives,
i.e., infer on possible counterparties from the co-movement of the engagement of institutions.
The Network of OTC Derivatives
Activities and Ranks
In order to reconstruct the network of counterparty risk from the available dataset, we need to
introduce a few variables that are later to be mapped to specific data.
First of all, we identify each institution in the dataset by an index i = 1, ..., N , where N = 61,
i.e., the total number of distinct institutions. Note that the dataset for each quarter only lists the
25 best ranked institutions, which are not necessarily the same for each quarter (see also Fig. 2).
Thus, during the whole period of 14 years, 61 different institutions appeared in the dataset.
At each time step t, where t is discrete and measured in quarters, up to T = 57, institutions i
and j can act as counterparties, i.e., they have contracts of total volume xij(t). Importantly, the
dataset neither lists the counterparties j nor the volume of their contracts, xij(t). It lists, however,
the quarterly activity of each institution, ai(t) =
∑N
j=1 xij(t), i.e., the aggregated volume, given
in column 5 of Table A in Supporting Information Thus, the aim of our paper is to reconstruct
the network of dependencies from this aggregated data. Note that, if an institution was not active
in a particular quarter, i.e., not listed in the dataset for that period, its activity is set to zero.
To give an example, Fig. 3 shows the activity of two banks that are consistently engaged in
OTC derivatives in every quarter. Impressively enough, their activities differ in about two orders
of magnitude and further show a different business strategy over time. While the quarterly
activity of Keybank remains almost constant over 12 years, the activity of Bank of America grew
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BANK OF AMERICA
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
CITIBANK
HSBC BANK USA
WELLS FARGO BANK
WACHOVIA BANK
STATE STREET BANK&TRUST CO
BANK OF NEW YORK
PNC BANK
SUNTRAST BANK
KEYBANK
NATIONAL CITY BANK
NORTHERN TRUST CO
MELLON BANK
U S BANK
DEUTSCHE BANK TR CO AMERICAS
LASALLE BANK
BANK ONE
FLEET NATIONAL BANK
FIRST TENNESSEE BANK
GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA
FIFTH THIRD BANK
REGIONS BANK
BRANCH BANKING&TRUST CO
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF IN
MERRILL LYNCH BANK USA
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
LASALLE BANK MIDWEST
UNION BANK
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK
MORGAN GUARANTY TR CO OF NY
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK
MORGAN STANLEY BANK
CAPITAL ONE
RBS CITIZENS
TD BANK
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK USA
ALLY BANK
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK
COMERICA BANK
TD BANK USA
UBS BANK USA
BANKBOSTON
FIRST NB OF CHICAGO
CITIBANK SOUTH DAKOTA
NATIONSBANK
REPUBLIC NB OF NEW YORK
IRWIN UNION BANK&TRUST CO
CHASE BANK OF TEXAS
BMO HARRIS BANK
BOKF
BANK OF OKLAHOMA
LEHMAN BROTHERS COML BK
COUNTRYWIDE BANK
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC
FREMONT INVESTMENT&LOAN
CITIBANK NEVADA
FLAGSTAR BANK FSB
FIA CARD SERVICES
GMAC BANK
WOODLANDS COMMERCIAL BANK
1 5 10 15 20 25
Figure 2: Time series of the financial institutions appearing among the 25 top ranked between
1998 and 2012. Color codes the rank: the darker the color the better the rank (rank 1 considered
the highest), white indicates the absence in the ranking.
exponentially during the same period of time, clearly shown in the linear slope in the logarithmic
plot. Only in 2012, after the financial crisis, this involvement was slightly reduced.
Based on the quarterly activities, ai(t), we can assign each institution i a rank ri(t) ← r[ai(t)]
with r discrete and r ∈ {1, 2, ...N} such that r[ai(t)] < r[aj(t)] if ai(t) > aj(t) for any pair
i, j ∈ N . I.e., rank 1 corresponds to the institution with the highest activity value at time t, rank
7/36
Vahan Nanumyan, Antonios Garas, Frank Schweitzer:
The Network of Counterparty Risk: Analysing Correlations in OTC Derivatives,
published in PLoS ONE 10(9), e0136638. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0136638
1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
Year
a i
[m
illi
on
 U
SD
]
104
2
5
105
2
5
106
2
5
107
2
5
108
BANK OF AMERICA
KEYBANK
Figure 3: The total derivatives notional amount of two banks which constantly appear during
the whole period from 1998 to 2012. The difference of order of magnitude motivates to take
into account the ranks of institutions when building their network. The linear regression slope
for log(aBoA) for the period 1999/Q3 – 2011/Q3 (bolder line) is 0.206638, which corresponds to
yearly growth ratio (at(t+ 1)/ai(t)) equal to 1.229537.
2 to the one with the second highest activity, and so forth. If an institution was not active in a
given period, its rank is set to zero. Because the rank ri considers the position relative to other
institutions, it can change even if the activity of an institution remained constant over a certain
period.
Fig. 2 gives an overview of how often the institutions were present in the ranking up to 25 in
any of the quarters, with their ranks color coded. This matrix already indicates that there are
remarkable fluctuations in the ranks of most of the institutions, except for a group of about 10
institutions. Fig. 4 gives a more detailed picture by plotting the ranks of this group over time. We
observe that there exists a smaller core group (of about 7 members) with consistently low ranks,
which can be well separated from a second group with higher, and more fluctuating, ranks.
This can be also observed by looking at the ranks Ri ← r[Ai] resulting from the aggregated
activities Ai =
∑T
t=1 ai(t). Plotting the inverse function A(R) shown in Fig. 5, we observe a
rather skew distribution of the aggregated activities with respect to the rank, with a skewness
value γ = 4.637150 and a Gini coefficient [8] g = 0.9558996. Moreover, the plot suggests that
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Figure 4: Changes of the ranks ri(t) of a set of banks, with the number showing their dis-
tance to the core of the weighted network based on the co-occurrence and activity of financial
institutions introduced in Temporal and aggregated networks.
the aggregated activity A follows a log-normal distribution with respect to the rank R:
A(R) =
1
Rσ
√
2pi
· exp
[
−(lnR− µ)
2
2σ2
]
; R ≥ 1 (1)
where µ = 14.54116 is the mean value and σ = 2.865165 the standard deviation of the distribu-
tion. To further compare the empirical with the log-normal distribution, Fig. A in Supporting
Information shows the Q−Q plot and gives the results of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test.
The inset of Fig. 5 presents the cumulative distribution P (R < Y ) =
∑Y
R=1A(R). It indicates
that about 95% of the total activity results from the seven first ranked institutions, while the 15
first ranked institutions cover more than 99% of the total activity. It may be tempting to restrict
the analysis to only these 15 institutions. However, the aggregated activities do not allow to draw
conclusions about the concentration of activities in certain time periods or a change of strategy
in choosing counterparties, before and after the financial crisis. Therefore, we will present more
details on the temporal activities in Section Temporal and aggregated networks.
The available data also allows us to analyse the composition of the activities ai(t) with respect to
exchange traded derivatives (ETD) and OTC derivatives. I.e., the value of the total derivatives
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Figure 5: Distribution of the aggregated activity Ai over the rank Ri obtained from the whole
reporting period. (inset) Cumulative sum P (R < Y ) =
∑Y
R=1A(R). The ceiling of the distri-
bution, which is the capacity of the market over the whole period of time is shown by the grey
line, while the orange line shows the corresponding 95% percentile.
is split into ai(t) = aETDi (t) + a
OTC
i (t) and Ai = A
ETD
i + A
OTC
i , respectively. Already the sheer
numbers of the ai(t) and aOTCi (t) tell that OTC derivatives make up for the vast amount of
contracts. I.e., we should not assume that the ranks ri(t) or Ri obtained from both ETD and
OTC derivatives are different from those ranks that would result from only considering the values
of aOTCi (t) or A
OTC
i . To test this hypothesis, Fig. B in the Supporting Information provides a
Q−Q plot to compare both values. We see that up to rank 15 there is no difference in the ranks
obtained by these two measures, whereas between ranks 15 and 50 the difference in ranks would
be 1 or 2. Only for ranks above 50, the differences become remarkable. So it is reasonable to use
the ranks ri(t) and Ri in the further evaluation.
However, when analysing the counterparty risk in derivative contracts, we will make a distinction
between the (less risky) ETD and the more risky OTC derivatives. In fact, as Fig. 6 indicates,
the importance of OTC derivatives as compared to the ETD vastly differs across institutions.
The ratio AOTCi /A
ETD
i is below 10 for about 1/3 of all institutions, which implies that 10% or
more of the activities is in ETD. However, looking at the 15 best ranked institutions, we see
for most of them the ETD business accounts for only 2%-5% of their activity. So again, it is
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reasonable to proxy activities related to OTC derivatives by the total activities - but whenever
possible, we will take into account the real values for OTC derivatives.
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i versus ranks Ri based on the total activity Ai.
Temporal and aggregated networks
In order to estimate the link structure of the network of counterparty risk, we first look into
the co-occurrence of any two institutions among the 25 best ranked institutions in each given
quarter. I.e., we define a link as lij(t) = 1 if for both institutions 1 ≤ {ri(t), rj(t)} ≤ 25 and
lij(t) = 0, otherwise. Their co-occurrence does not necessarily imply that the two institutions
are counterparties of an OTC derivative. A ranked institution i could do all its OTC contracts
with the many institutions that have ranks too high (i.e., activities too low), to be listed in this
dataset. Practically, however, this cannot be the case because, as the OCC reports verify, already
99% of all OTC derivatives are held by the 25 best ranked institutions. So, the not listed ones
would make only for 1%, which cannot explain the large activities of any of the 25 best ranked
institutions. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that i has at least one contract with any
of the other 24 institutions, and the best ranked institutions have likely more than one.
The co-occurrence network certainly overestimates the business relations based on OTC contracts
because it is basically a fully connected network between the 25 best ranked institutions. Further,
the co-occurrence may change in each quarter. Therefore, as the next step, it is reasonable to
assign weights for the links between any two institutions based on the number of quarters, they
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co-appear in the dataset. I.e., we define weights as
wij =
1
T
T∑
t=1
lij(t) (2)
to normalize them to the available time period. A node that has links with high weights to its
neighbors certainly represents an important institution in the OTC derivatives market. We use
the weights to define the importance of an institution asWi =
∑N
j=1wij . In the following network
figures, the size of the nodes is scaled to the normalized importance, Wi/
∑
iWi.
This allows us now, based on the aggregated values, to draw in Fig. 7 a first approximation of
the network of counterparty risk. While this figure clearly shows the important institutions with
respect to their co-occurrence, it neglects another important information, namely their ranking
which is a proxy of their relative activity. Imagine institution i with a steady but relatively
low activity over time, just enough for frequently appearing in the network, while institution j
may have a much higher activity, but during a shorter period of time, resulting in a better, but
less frequent ranking. As a result, institution i will be over-presented in the network drawn in
Fig. 7, while institution j will be under-represented. Such activity differences are prevalent in
the dataset as the investigations in Section Activities and Ranks show. In the example shown in
Fig. 3, the activity of Keybank was two to three orders of magnitude lower than the activity of
Bank of America. But because KeyBank was present in the top 25 list during the whole time
period, it gained a similar position in the network in Fig. 7 as giants such as Bank of America
or Citibank.
Therefore, to further improve our estimation of the network of counterparty risk, we take into
account the overall activity of an institution by using their ranks to assign weights to the links
of co-occurrence. I.e., instead of lij(t) = 1, we use
lij(t) = min
{
1
ri(t)
,
1
rj(t)
}
(3)
The rationale behind is to bind the weight of a link to the activity of the less active institution.
To elucidate this, let us assume that institution i is a big player with rank ri(t) = 2 at time t,
while j is a less important institution with rank rj(t) = 21. Because both institutions co-appear
in the same quarter, each of them has links to all other institutions listed in the same time period,
i.e., 24 links. For the less important institution j, 20 of these links get assigned a weight of 1/20,
namely those links to institutions with better ranks. But there are 4 links to institutions with an
activity less than j and therefore with higher ranks. Those links get assigned the weights 1/22,
1/23, 1/24, 1/25. I.e., for each institution, links to less active counterparties have less weight,
while links to more active counterparties have the maximum weight that could occur given the
rank of that institution. Likewise, for institution i only one link, namely the link to the highest
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Figure 7: Weighted network based on the co-occurrence of financial institutions in the top 25
ranking, aggregated over all quarter years. The size of a node increases with its importance Wi,
the width of the links increases with their weights wij , where lij ∈ {0, 1} (i.e., do not depend on
the ranks). The links are colored according to the non-normalized correlation coefficient (defined
in Section Correlations in activities) between activities in OTC derivatives of the two banks.
ranked institution, gets a weight 1/2, whereas the 23 links to all other institutions become less
and less important as 1/3, 1/4, ..., 1/25.
The resulting network is shown as an animation (at the time of writing only supported in Adobe R©
products) in Fig. D in Supporting Information. At each time step this is a fully connected
network, but the weights of the links, as well as the importance of the institutions, change
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during every timestep. The animation nicely elucidates the emergence of new key players in
the OTC derivatives markets before and after the crisis, as well as the changed preferences in
choosing counterparties.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ALLY BANK
BANKBOSTON
BANK OF AMERICA
BANK OF NEW YORK
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
BANK OF OKLAHOMA
BANK ONE
BMO HARRIS BANK
BOKF
BRANCH BANKING&TRUST CO
CAPITAL ONE
CHASE BANK OF TEXAS
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK USA
CITIBANK
CITIBANK NEVADA
CITIBANK SOUTH DAKOTA
COMERICA BANK
COUNTRYWIDE BANK
DEUTSCHE BANK TR CO AMERICAS
FIA CARD SERVICES
FIFTH THIRD BANK
FIRST NB OF CHICAGO
FIRST TENNESSEE BANK
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK
FLAGSTAR BANK FSB
FLEET NATIONAL BANK
FREMONT INVESTMENT&LOAN
GMAC BANK
GOLDMAN SACHS BANK USA
HSBC BANK USAHUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK
IRWIN UNION BANK&TRUST CO
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
KEYBANK
LASALLE BANK
LASALLE BANK MIDWEST
LEHMAN BROTHERS COML BK
MELLON BANK
MERRILL LYNCH BANK USA
MORGAN GUARANTY TR CO OF NY
MORGAN STANLEY BANK
NATIONAL CITY BANK
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF IN
NATIONSBANK
NORTHERN TRUST CO
PNC BANK
RBS CITIZENS
REGIONS BANK
REPUBLIC NB OF NEW YORK
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC
STATE STREET BANK&TRUST CO
SUNTRAST BANK
TD BANK
TD BANK USA
UBS BANK USA
UNION BANK
U S BANK
WACHOVIA BANK
WELLS FARGO BANK
WOODLANDS COMMERCIAL BANK
l
l
l
l
ll
l
Wi
     10−3
2
5
     10−2
2
5
6.5
ρij
  −1
   0
   1
Figure 8: Weighted network based on the co-occurrence and activity of financial institutions
in the top 25 ranking, aggregated over all quarter years. The coding of size and color of nodes
and links are the same as in Fig. 7, but the wij and Wi are calculated from the lij as given by
Eq. (3) i.e., dependent on the ranks. The time resolved network is shown in Fig. D in Supporting
Information. The aggregated network should be compared with Fig. 7 where activities are not
taken into account.
To allow a comparison with Fig. 7, we aggregate the weights of the links over time according to
Eq. (2), to take into account both co-occurrence and activity, and calculate the importance of an
institution as before, Wi =
∑N
j=1wij . The resulting weighted network is then shown in Fig. 8,
which should be compared to Fig. 7. The most obvious difference is a less dense core, built up by
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a smaller number of important institutions, in Fig. 8. Tracing particular institutions, e.g. Union
Bank, we see that their position becomes less influential. But the core of the network, i.e., the
set of the ten most important institutions, remains the same and shall be investigated in the
following.
Core-periphery structure
So far, we have used the following information to describe counterparty relations: (i) Aggregated
measures derived from the aggregated co-occurrence lij in the ranking of the 25 top players in the
OTC market, in particular the weights wij and the importance Wi. The results are concluded
in the network of Fig. 7. (ii) Temporal measures derived from the ranking ri(t), in particular
the temporal co-occurrence lij(t). The results are concluded in the animated network of Fig. D
in Supporting Information, with the time-aggregated network shown in Fig. 8. While the latter
can be seen as the most refined network of counterparty risk, the characterization of both nodes
and links is still based on the activity ai(t) of the respective institution, i.e., it is derived from a
single scalar measure. So, the question is whether the reconstruction of the aggregated temporal
network would allow us to add another dimension to characterize institutions, based on topological
information.
Already a visual inspection of Figs. 7 and 8 verifies that the network is rather heterogeneous with
respect to its density. We can easily detect a core of larger (i.e., more active) and more densely
connected nodes which can be distinguished from a periphery of nodes that are smaller (i.e., less
active) and less densely connected. In fact, peripheral nodes are mostly connected towards the
core and much less to other peripheral nodes. The core of the network is depicted in Fig. 9 and
gives a good impression of the fully connected network, albeit with links of different weights.
Whether institutions can be found in the core or in the periphery of the network certainly relates
to their importance in the OTC market. In order to quantify the topological information encoded
in the network structure, we use the weighted K core analysis, which is an established method
to assign an importance value to nodes. In the first step, for the time aggregated network shown
in Fig. 8, each node gets assigned a weighted degree kˆi [9]:
kˆi =
kαi
 ki∑
j
wij
β

1
α+β
,
where ki is the degree of node i, i.e., its number of links to neighboring nodes, and
∑ki
j wij is
the sum over all its link weights as defined in Eqn. (2) with the weighted lij given by Eqn. (3).
The exponents α and β are used to weight the two different contributions, i.e., number of links
versus weight of links. In our analysis we used α = 0 and β = 1, i.e., we focused only on the
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Figure 9: The core of the aggregated weighted temporal network presented in Fig.8. For the
coding see the legend in Fig.8.
weights since the network is almost fully connected and the node degree does not give us any
information.
In the second step, we follow a pruning procedure to recursively remove all nodes with degree
kˆ ≤ K from the network, where K = 1, 2, ..... I.e., first all nodes with kˆ ≤ 1 are removed, which
may leave the network with other nodes that now have kˆ ≤ 1 simply because some of their
neighbors were removed. So the procedure continues with removing these nodes, too, unless no
nodes with kˆ ≤ 1 are left. Then all nodes removed during this step get assigned to a core K = 1,
and the procedure continues to successively remove all nodes with degree kˆ ≤ 2 and assign them
to a core K = 2, etc. The procedure stops at a certain high core value, K, when all nodes are
removed. The higher the K-core a node is assigned to, the more it belongs to the “core” of the
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network and the more important it is, from a topological perspective. Evidently, nodes assigned
to a core with low K value are much less integrated in the network. This does not refer simply
to the number of neighbors, but also to non-local properties such as the number of neighbors of
their neighbors, because the K-core decomposition also takes these into account. That means,
the K-core a node is assigned to reflects is position in the network much better than simple
measures such as the degree (i.e., the number of neighbors), alone.
The results of the weighted K-core analysis are shown in the left side of Fig. C in Supporting
Information, where the K value is normalized to 1. Based on their K value, institutions can
be ranked such that the higher the K value (i.e., the better the integration in the network),
the better the rank. This topological ranking does not necessarily coincides with the ranking
Ri obtained from the aggregated activity Ai which is shown on the right side of Fig. C in
Supporting Information, for comparison. This indicates that structural measures based on the
network topology indeed provide information different from the temporal measures based on the
market activities of the institutions. But, comparing the left and the right sides with respect to
the color coding, we observe that only in a few cases institutions have considerably different levels
of importance dependent on the measurement. It would be worth looking at these in a case-by-
case study, to find out which importance measure better reflects their overall performance in the
financial market.
We note that, for consistency, we have used the ranking obtained from the weighted K-core
analysis to sort the different institutions in the figures, in particular in Fig. 2 where their presence
in the dataset is given, and in Figs. 11 and 12 where the correlations in activities and in risk are
presented.
Correlations
Correlation measures
So far, we have analysed the co-occurrence of financial institutions in the set of the 25 best
ranked institutions, weighted by their ranks. These ranks were based on their activities, i.e.,
total derivatives. As a result, we could reconstruct the weighted network of counterparty risk
which also reflects the importance of the nodes. This network was reconstructed (a) on a time
resolution of one quarter year, to show the dynamics of the network (Fig. D in Supporting
Information), and (b) on the time aggregated level (Fig. 8).
To further analyse the mutual dependence between the best ranked institutions, we now calcu-
late different correlations. The network of counterparty risk has revealed how the co-occurrence
changes over time. But will the OTC derivatives of institution i increase, or decrease, if the same
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measure of institution j increases? Answering this question allows some more refined conclusions
about the dependence between these institutions.
The simplest measure is the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ, which points to a linear de-
pendence between two variables. As explained above, for each institution i we have a dataset
ai = {ai(1), ai(2), ..., ai(T )} available which contains up to T entries about its quarterly activity
ai(t) measured by means of its total derivatives. We recall that some of these entries are zero
whenever institution i was not listed among the best 25 ranked. Let us define the mean value
and the standard deviation of each of these samples as:
a¯i =
1
T
T∑
t=1
ai(t) ; s
a
i =
√√√√ 1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
[
ai(t)− a¯i
]2
. (4)
The Pearson correlation coefficient with respect to the variable a is then defined as
ρaij =
1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
[
ai(t)− a¯i
sai
][
aj(t)− a¯j
saj
]
. (5)
Values of ρ can be between -1 and +1. The latter indicates that the relation between activities
ai and aj can be perfectly described by a linear relationship, where ai increases as aj increases.
-1, on the other hand, indicates a perfect linear relationship where ai decreases as aj increases,
and vice versa. Zero would indicate that there are no linear dependencies detected in the data.
Eq. (5) also shows that, in case of a positive correlation, if ai(k) > a¯i then also aj(k) > a¯j for
most of the time, and if ai(k) < a¯i then also aj(k) < a¯j for most of the time, i.e., the activities
of both institutions are mostly above (or below) their respective average, at the same time.
Correlations in activities
We first discuss the results for the most active institutions, i.e., those appearing among the 25
best ranked institutions with respect to their total derivatives in every quarter. Interestingly,
this applies only to 8 out of the 61 listed institutions. Fig. 10 shows the correlation matrix for
these institutions, their activities proxied by the total notional amount of derivative contracts as
listed in column 5 of Table A in Supporting Information.
There are two observations to be made: (i) the correlations between any two of these institutions
are always positive and often even close to 1, (ii) Keybank is a noticeable exception. This can be
explained by the combination of two effects: The first one is the vastly growing market in OTC
derivative during the observation period which resulted in the growth of OTC derivatives for these
core institutions. Thus, the observed correlations could, in principle, be caused by the underlying
market dynamics rather than by the mutual interaction. However, taking into account that the
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Figure 10: Correlation matrix of the reported total derivatives of the institutions appearing in
top 25 commercial banks, savings associations or trust companies in derivatives during the whole
period from 1998 to 2012.
10 best ranked institutions already account for 95% of the OTC derivatives market, there is little
room for the assumption that their growth is based on OTC derivative contracts with institutions
that do not belong to the core of 10, or to the 25 best ranked institutions. In conclusion, these
eight institutions increased their OTC derivatives activities by repeatedly choosing the same
core institutions as counterparties. The low correlations for Keybank could result both from the
absence of growth (see Fig. 3), while all others were growing, and from choosing counterparties
from outside the set of core banks.
If we wish to extend this correlation analysis to the whole set of 61 institutions, it would generate
a number of artifacts which should be avoided. We discuss them here, first, to motivate our own
approach presented afterward. As already shown in Fig. 2, most of these institutions were not
present in the ranking of the best 25, for some longer or shorter period. So, one could limit
the correlation analysis to those quarters where the two institutions were indeed present in the
ranking. I.e., if institution i appeared at times t1, t2, t3, t4 and while institution j appeared at
times t2, t4, t5, t6, the correlation coefficient for them is computed using only the observations at
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times t2 and t4 where both were present. The Pearson correlation coefficient based on pairwise
available observations with respect to the variable a is then defined as
ρaij =
1
#[Ti ∩ Tj ]− 1
∑
t∈Ti∩Tj
[
ai(t)− a¯i
sai
][
aj(t)− a¯j
saj
]
(6)
Ti and Tj are subsets of {1, 2, ..., T}, comprising the time steps when the institutions i and j
appeared in the ranking among the top 25, and #[Ti] and #[Ti] are the numbers of these time
steps. Ti ∩ Tj then defines the subset of timesteps where both institutions i and j appeared
together, and #[Ti ∩ Tj ] gives the respective number of those time steps. Consequently, the
average activity a¯i and the standard deviation sai are also calculated only for the subset Ti:
a¯i =
1
#[Ti]
∑
t∈Ti
ai(t) ; s
a
i =
√
1
#[Ti]− 1
∑
t∈Ti
[
ai(t)− a¯i
]2 (7)
The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. E in Supporting Information. We observe that, in
addition to the strong correlations in the core of those institutions always present, there are a lot
of strongly anti-correlated activities (indicated by rich red) among the low ranked institutions
which need to be interpreted, both with respect to the correlation and to the magnitude. We
start with the latter.
Defining the Pearson correlation coefficient according to Eqn. (6) has the drawback that the
correlation coefficients for different institutions are no longer normalized to the same number of
observations, T , as in Eq. (5) and thus cannot be compared. Precisely, the correlations between
Bank of America and Citibank, which were both present in the ranking for T = 57 quarters will
get the same weight as the correlations between Citibank Nevada and Chase Manhattan Bank
USA which were present together only two times.
The second drawback results from the time lapse between the co-appearance. While the times
t4 and t6 in the above example may still be relatively close, the interval between t4 and t56
would be much longer and, because of the unknown intermediate values, interpretations about
the correlated move of both institutions become highly speculative.
In contrast to the above example, in which the two intermediaries appear only in a few quarters,
but yet co-appear twice, some pairs of intermediaries which are important both by means of
long term presence and good rankings, never appeared together, for example Goldman Sachs and
Bank of New York, and, as a consequence, the Pearson correlation coefficient is not even defined
for them, which is yet another drawback.
One could argue that these drawbacks disappear if we simply keep the normalization T , as in
Eqs. (4)(5), and instead assign an activity ai(t) = 0 whenever an institution i is not present in
the ranking. While there is no evidence that the activity was indeed zero, the error produced
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this way is certainly small because of the very skew distribution of activities shown in Fig. 5, and
both the mean and the standard deviation of the activity are not substantially affected. But it
becomes a problem when there is indeed no data because the institution does not exist in certain
quarters, e.g. because of mergers and acquisitions, as in the case of Chase Manhattan Bank and
JPMorgan Chase Bank.
Additionally, by proceeding like this we would generate another artifact, namely generating
artificial correlations between those institutions that are often not in the rankings and, in the
worst case, never co-appear. It is in fact the absence of data that generates their correlations,
artificially. Taking again the example of Goldman Sachs and Bank of New York, these two
institutions would then appear anti-correlated while, in fact, no correlation was defined for them.
Thus, solving the above mentioned drawbacks this way would generate yet a different one.
Consequently, we will go with the correlations defined on the pairwise co-appearance, Eqn. (6),
but we compensate for the different normalization by multiplying the correlation coefficients
ρaij with the weights wij defined in Eq. (2) with lij = 1, which is the relative number of co-
appearances. This implies that the correlations between two institutions that rarely co-appeared
in the ranking are scaled down. Precisely, after this correction, the weights wij define the bounds
of the values of the correlation coefficients, which are different for each pair of institution, namely
[−wij ,+wij ] instead of [−1,+1]. These weighted correlation coefficients shall be interpreted dif-
ferently from the conventional correlation coefficients in that a close-to-zero coefficient no longer
means that the variables are uncorrelated, but that there is no significant correlation because of
the low weight.
The resulting correlation matrix is shown in Fig. 11. Compared to the non-scaled Fig. E in
Supporting Information, both the correlated and the anti-correlated activities loose importance
for institutions with higher ranks, because the co-appearance in the ranking is rather sparse.
But still, it is obvious that the correlated activities are concentrated in the core, while the anti-
correlated activities can be mostly found in the periphery. Keeping in mind the exponential
growth of the derivative volume of some of the key players, as shown in Fig. 3, it means that the
OTC market acted rather heterogeneous. Most banks with high ranks, i.e., key players, increased
their activities in a growing market. Banks with lower ranks, such as First National Bank of
Chicago or RBS Citizens, have either reduced their overall OTC exposure or have concentrated
their activities towards only mayor institutions, avoiding other low ranked institutions.
Correlations in risk
So far, we have only analysed correlations in activities, i.e., the correlated increase or decrease in
OTC derivatives volumes between any two institutions. We found that the correlated behavior
was the dominating one which, together with a vastly growing OTC market, implies that most
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Figure 11: non-normalized Pearson correlation coefficients ρij (based on pairwise available
data), scaled by wij with lij = 1.
institutions increased their involvement. The question remains what this would mean for the risk
of the counterparties,
We already mentioned in Section Risk involved in OTC derivatives that credit risk is the main
source of risk for banking institutions. To estimate the total credit exposure (TCE), we sum up
their current credit exposure (CCE) and their potential future exposure (PFE) as explained in
Section Risk involved in OTC derivatives. This data has been made available in “Table 4” of the
OCC reports for each quarter year (see Table B in Supporting Information) and is used for our
subsequent correlation analysis. “Table 4” lists, for each of the 25 first ranked institutions, the
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bilaterally netted current credit exposure and the bilaterally netted potential future exposure and
the sum of both, TCE=CCE+PFE, as reported by the institutions themselves. Looking at Q1
of 2012, we first notice that, for the high ranked institutions (according to their activity in OTC
derivatives), the potential future exposure exceeds considerably the current exposure, which is
generally not the case for the lower ranked institutions. The question whether this observation
is related to the financial crisis of 2008 is addressed further below.
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(a) Bilaterally netted current credit exposures
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(b) Total credit exposure
Figure 12: Non-normalized Pearson correlation coefficients ρCCEij and ρ
TCE
ij (based on pairwise
available data), scaled by wij with lij = 1.
We can now define a correlation coefficient ρTCEij based on Eq. (6) by just replacing the values of
the activities ai(t) by TCEi(t), and for ρCCEij accordingly. Following the argumentation above, we
weight these correlations again by the weights wij . The results are shown in Fig. 12. Both figure
parts indicate that, at least for the subset of banks which are the closest to the core according
to the core-periphery decomposition, the credit exposures are highly positively correlated. This
indicates that the core of the network consists of institutions which are very strongly interdepen-
dent. This can become a reason for systemic instability, as the credit exposures and the connected
risks cannot be well diversified.
The correlation pattern for the risk resembles the one found for the activities, Fig. 11. We have
to note, however, that a large correlation coefficient ρaij is a good indicator of a long-term activity
23/36
Vahan Nanumyan, Antonios Garas, Frank Schweitzer:
The Network of Counterparty Risk: Analysing Correlations in OTC Derivatives,
published in PLoS ONE 10(9), e0136638. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0136638
between institutions i and j, but a large correlation coefficient ρTCEij does not allow us to derive
such a conclusion.
Up to this point the analysis was based on the whole available period of time (1998 – 2012). It
is interesting to repeat the correlation analysis of risk for the time before and after the financial
crisis, separately. We avoid to discuss the precise mapping of “before” and “after” and have
chosen Q4 of 2008 to divide the time series into two periods. In Q4 of 2008 Goldman Sachs
entered the ranking of the OCC, for the first time, right after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
on 15 September, 2008.
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(a) Total credit exposure before 2008 Q4
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(b) Total credit exposure after 2008 Q4
Figure 13: Correlations in total credit exposure (a) before and (b) after the financial crisis of
2008 Q4.
The results of our analysis before and after Q4 of 2008 are shown in Fig. 13. Comparing the
two parts of the figure, we make two observations: (i) All listed banks follow a similar behavior
before and after the crisis. But after the crisis the correlations became more homogeneous and
non-negative even between low-to-low ranked and low-to-high ranked institutions. (ii) Except
only few banks, the key players in the core did not change. Therefore, the OTC derivatives
market structurally remained the same despite its vast growth.
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Conclusions
Our investigation reveals the hidden network structure behind the OTC market in the United
States, and the network evolution from 1998 to 2012. For this, we use publicly available data from
the [1] reports, which contains aggregated numbers about the activities of financial institutions,
measured by the volume of their different derivatives.
We focus on two different aspects: (i) co-occurrence patterns of institutions, which take into
account their ranks and activities to reconstruct the network of counterparty risk. This network
was further analysed using of a weighted k-core method, to reveal its core-periphery structure.
This allowed us to compare the topology-based ranking with the activity-based ranking, and to
identify the most important institutions and their mutual relations. (ii) correlation patters, to
reveal dependencies in activities, and the subsequent counterparty risks of any two institutions.
Our findings, namely an emergence of a pronounced core and the higher correlations in credit
exposure associated with it, hint at increasing counterparty and systemic risk in OTC derivatives
market.
One could argue that the list of the few top institutions with the highest counterparty risk is
not really surprising and financial experts would have known this anyway. But the point of our
investigation is to present a formal, yet simple approach, to decompose their known aggregated
activities into unknown bilateral exposures. Only this allows us to reveal the hidden network, and
to estimate the systemic risk. Counterparty risk is not just the sum of individual risks, but can
be amplified over the network of dependencies. Precisely, the failure of single institutions, even
in the periphery of the OTC network, can lead to the collapse of the whole system because of
distress and load distributed over the network [11].
Such considerations do not only enhance our understanding of systemic risk, they also allow to
develop more refined risk measures, and a more realistic pricing of OTC contracts. This network
perspective is missing in existing investigations [12, 13] on systemic risk in OTC derivatives
markets. It moves the focus from discussing netting procedures after a default to the more
important question of how systemic risk emerges, i.e., what happens before a default.
To conclude, our investigations contribute to the ongoing debate about the impact of the OTC
derivatives market on the stability of the financial markets. We support the position that OTC
derivatives increase financial instability, because they generate a hidden network of dependencies
that at the end increase the chance of failure cascades. This has not become obvious because
of the bilateral nature of counterparty risk and the lack of transparency in OTC markets. But
our simple and practical method allows to at least estimate this hidden network of additional
dependencies and to better estimate, and price, the risk resulting from these. It particularly
points to the limitations in diversifying risk in such markets and the need to implement further
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regulations, as already proposed by the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)
under the Basel III umbrella BCBS (2011).
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Supporting Information
Appendix 1: Data Availability and Processing
Our quantitative analysis is based on a dataset derived from the quarterly reports on derivatives
of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
These reports contain, for each quarter, different tables with derivatives data of the top 25 US
national insured commercial banks and trust companies. A typical “Table 1” from the first quarter
of 2012 [1] is shown in Tab. A in the Appendix. The unit for all numbers is 1 million US dollars.
The first column contains the ranks and the second column the name of the institution. The
data used for the ranking can be found in the fifth column, labeled Total derivatives. It gives a
proxy for the activity of an institution. The most active one is assigned rank 1 and referred to
as the “highest ranked” (or best ranked) in the following. In the second set of columns, “Table
1” of these reports further presents the composition of the derivatives contracts into exchange
traded derivatives (ETD) (futures contracts, option contracts) and Over-The-Counter (OTC)
traded derivatives (forwards, swaps, options and credit derivatives). In the last column, foreign
exchange spots are reported but not included in the sum of total derivatives.
Below the list of the ranked institutions, Tab. A reports three important rows: (a) the sum of the
derivative contracts for the top 25 ranked institutions, (b) the sum of the derivative contracts of
all other reporting institutions (with the number of these stated in the reports until 2007/Q1
and (c) the sum of (a) and (b) referring to the whole market.
Such Tables are available for each quarter between 1998/Q4 and 2012/Q4, i.e., for 57 quarters.
The full OCC quarterly reports on derivatives are available on the OCC website [1] in PDF
and raw data is available in XML format. In order to obtain the data on credit exposures from
derivative contracts, the latter was chosen and processed with the XML package of R statistical
environment. A technical problem was met and solved at this stage. The XML parser would not
process random rows of the data. Inconsistencies in the structure of XML were the source of the
problem and were found by manually checking the problematic rows. In the these rows one or
two excessive empty data nodes were present, after deletion of which the whole available data
was parsed. No XML file is published by OCC for the 2008 Q3, so the PDF file of the report was
processed to obtain data and add it the rest of the dataset.
The next step after obtaining the data on credit exposures was merging it with the original
dataset on notional amounts of derivative contracts. A technical hurdle was in matching different
typesetting of the names of some institutions (e.g. extra spaces). At this stage few missing entries
in the original dataset were found and fixed.
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The raw data was combined into a CSV table and included 17 columns with the data from the
mentioned two tables of the OCC reports. The chosen time range corresponded to 57 quarters,
with 25 entries for every one summing up to 1425 rows in the table. Every row included the
time-stamp, name of the institution, its rank, state, total assets, total derivatives, total amounts
of 7 types of derivatives, bilaterally netted current credit exposure, potential future exposure,
total credit exposure from all contracts and total credit exposure to capital ratio (the last in
percents).
The number of unique combinations of name and state in the raw dataset was 93, but the states
were left out of consideration. Thus in the present analysis two actors with the same name
but from different states were considered to be the same actor. The technical legitimacy of this
assumption is based on the fact that no two actors with the same name but from different states
simultaneously appeared in the reports. Checking the legal validity of the assumption is not in
the scope of this analysis.
The number of entries differing by the name of the institution was 82 in the raw data. The names
were processed and their number reduced to 61. The conditions for merging two similar names
were the absence of simultaneous appearance in the reports, similar ranks and orders of reported
numbers. Again, legal aspects for merging these data were not considered. The main source of
ambiguity in names were “NA” and “NATIONAL ASSN” endings. These were dropped and so, for
example, “KEYBANK NA” and “KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSN” became “KEYBANK”. Other
more specific changes in the names are presented in the list below (in bold is the chosen name).
CAPITAL ONE
Names in the original data were CAPITAL ONE BANK and CAPITAL ONE NATIONAL ASSN
DEUTSCHE BANK TR CO AMERICAS
BANKERS TRUST CO was renamed to DEUTSCHE BANK TR CO AMERICAS in April of 2002
MELLON BANK
MELLON was misspelled MELLONG
SUNTRUST BANK
The bank was reporting as SUNTRUST BANK ATLANTA before 2000
UNION BANK
The bank was reporting as UNION BANK OF CALIFORNIA until the 3rd quarter of 2008
BANKBOSTON
In the report from 1998 Q4 the name was BANKBOSTON CORPORATION
BANK OF AMERICA
BANK OF AMERICA was BANK OF AMERICA NT&SA until the mid 1999.
FIRST TENNESSEE
The bank was misspelled as FIRST TENESSE in one entry
BMO HARRIS BANK
The bank appeared as HARRIS TRUST&SAVINGS BANK
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LASALLE BANK MIDWEST
STANDARD FEDERAL BANK changed its name after being acquired by LaSalle Corp. in 2005
As described above, some banks which changed their names in the considered time period were
given the latest name for the whole time period, as in the present analysis the institutions
are distinguished by name. Assigning unique ID numbers to the institutions would make the
presentation of the results more abstract and less understandable.
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Appendix 2: Activities and ranks
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Figure A: Quantile-quantile plot of the aggregated activity Ai versus the fitted log-normal
distribution, µ=14.54116, σ=2.865165. In order to check if log-normal distribution is a good
candidate to describe the aggregated total derivatives distribution, 10000 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
two-sample tests were made for Ai against synthetic samples, from which 9856 tests were
positive for p-value equal to 0.10.
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Figure B: Ranks Ri based on the total activity Ai versus Ranks ROTCi based on the activity
resulting from OTC derivatives AOTCi
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Figure C: Comparison of the weighted k-core (left column) and Ri (right column) rankings.
Better ranks are on the top. Links connect the same institution in two rankings. The colors
represent k-core ranking, orange changes to green as the distance from core increases.
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Appendix 3: OTC network evolution
Figure D: Animation showing the evolution of the financial institutions’ network over time. An
institution is present in the network at certain time step if it is in the top 25 commercial banks,
savings associations or trust companies in derivatives. The network of these 25 institutions is
considered fully connected, with the weight of a link being proportional to the inverse of the
lowest rank of its end nodes. The size and color of a node represents the significance of the node
in terms of the sums of the weights of its links.
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Appendix 4: Correlations
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Figure E: Based on only pairwise available observations.
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